Michigan Law Review
Volume 67

Issue 4

1969

Estate Tax--Life Insurance--Section 2035 As a Basis for Including
Life Insurance Proceeds in the Gross Estate of an Insured Who
Paid Premiums on a Policy Owned by Another Person
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Estate Tax--Life Insurance--Section 2035 As a Basis for Including Life Insurance
Proceeds in the Gross Estate of an Insured Who Paid Premiums on a Policy Owned by Another Person, 67
MICH. L. REV. 812 (1969).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NOTES

ESTATE TAX-LIFE INSURANCE-Section 2035 As a
Basis :for Including Life Insurance Proceeds
in the Gross Estate of an lnsm·ed Who
Paid Premiums on a Policy Owned
hy Another Person
If a decedent possessed any of the incidents of ownership1 of a
life insurance policy, or if the policy proceeds were payable to his
executor, the entire amount of the insurance proceeds is included
in his estate for estate tax purposes under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code).2 However, if the decedent had
I. Among the incidents of ownership are included, generally, "the power to change
the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an
assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan
against the surrender value of the policy, etc." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-l(c)(2) (1968).
See Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957) (right to change beneficiary);
Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945) (right to cash surrender value);
Prichard v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (right to assign policy
as security for a loan); Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), afj'd, 195 F.2d
735 (9th Cir. 1952) (right to cancel policies and obtain income from the cash surrender
value); cf. Rev. Rul. 68-334, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 403. However, some interests in a
policy, such as the right to dividends, are not considered "incidents of ownership."
Old Point Nat'l Bank, 39 B.T.A. 343 (1939) (acq. 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 27); Blacksher v.
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 998 (1938) (acq. 1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 4).
While it is clear that "incidents of ownership" generally refers to the right of an
individual to control t4e disposition of the policy proceeds, there remains some question as to the extent of control required. C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES 279-81 (2d ed. 1962). It was once supposed that there must be "real,"
rather than "nominal," possession of the incidents of ownership before the proceeds
from a policy would be included in a decedent's estate. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co.
v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1965), vacated, 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
However, that theory was repudiated, and the district court's opinion thereaftet
vacated, when the Supreme Court decided, in Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678
(1965), that the proceeds of an airline flight insurance policy taken out for one flight
by the decedent shortly before a crash resulted in his death, were properly included
in his estate under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, even though,
on the facts of the case, it would have been impossible for the decedent to exercise
any of the incidents of ownership.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. This section provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property(!) Receivable by the executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent
with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of
ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. For
purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a
reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other
instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest
e..xceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the
decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" includes a
possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the de-
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transferred ownership of the policy to another person in a transaction that both met the requirements of section 20423 and was not
regarded as "in contemplation of death," 4 but continued to pay the
insurance premiums until his death, it is unclear whether any of
the proceeds are includible in his estate under any other provision
of the Code. 5
Prior to 1954, proceeds from life insurance were generally6 included in the gross estate of a decedent who had taken out the
policy and paid premiums, even though ownership of the policy
had been transferred to another person. From 1942 to 1954, a statute7 provided that the part of the insurance proceeds which was
attributable to the premiums paid by the decedent should be included.8 In the 1954 Code, this premium-payment test was deleted
cedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The
value of a revcrsionary interest at any time shall be determined (without regard
to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the
use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of a possibility
that the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposition by
the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such
policy or proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate.
3. The proceeds must not be made receivable by his executor upon decedent's
death and the decedent must not retain any of the incidents of ownership.
4. If a transfer is made more than three years prior to the date of death, it is
conclusively presumed not to have been made in contemplation of death. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b). If a transfer is made within three years of the date of death,
it is presumed, rebuttably, to have been made in contemplation of death. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b). The value of any property transferred "for adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth" will not be included in the estate
under the provision for transfers in contemplation of death. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 2035(a). As to various life motives which have been recognized with respect to the
transfer of life insurance policies, see cases cited in note 64 infra.
5. In particular, this Note is concerned with the applicability of the section 2035
provision dealing with transfers in contemplation of death. The regulations pertaining to section 2042 specifically indicate that a sum which is not includible under
that section may nonetheless be includible under section 2035. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1
(a)(2) (1958).
6. Before 1942, the statute was vague and the Treasury Department fluctuated between using and not using the premium-payment test. See I R. PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION § 10.13 (1942).
7. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (1942), which became INT. REv. CODE OF
1939, § 8ll(g).
8. The premium-payment test, as used under the 1942 addition to the 1939 Code
(see note 7 supra), provided for the inclusion of that part of the proceeds which bore
the same proportion to the premiums paid by the decedent as the full amount of the
proceeds bore to the total amount of premiums paid. If, for example, A insured his
life for $100,000, paid $30,000 in premiums, irrevocably assigned the policy to B and
then died after B had paid an additional $20,000 in premiums, the amount includible
in A's estate would be three-fifths of $100,000-or $60,000-since A had paid threefifths of all the premiums. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 275.
The fact that an individual could not avoid having some part of the proceeds
included in his estate if he had paid any premiums led to the rejection of this test
when the 1954 Code was enacted: "No other property is subject to estate tax where
the decedent initially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all
rights to the property and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not
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from the section providing for the inclusion of life insurance proceeds. 9 However, the question has since arisen whether this test
might be revived to include some portion of the proceeds in decedent's estate under section 2035, 10 the provision for transfers which
are made in contemplation of death.11
The question has been examined by various commentators; 12
many have concluded that at least some of the proceeds should be
included, 13 and all have recognized that such inclusion is a possibility. Generally, three theories have emerged.14 Under the first,
the full amount of the proceeds would be included on the grounds
that the transfer was not complete until the last premium was paid.
No case has accepted this theory, and the commentators have recognized that it 1s of limited significance at best.15 Under the second
justified." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). See also ALI, FEDERAL
EsTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECT STUDY xxii (Draft No. I 1965).
9. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. There bas been some dissastisfaction with
the current provision, since an individual may pass on unlimited amounts without
paying any tax and, of course, the proceeds are not taxable to the beneficiary as
income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § IOI. See C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note I,
at 277. See also ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECT 14 (1968). However, pro•
posed changes in section 2042 have failed to obtain support. ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX PROJECT 14 (1968).
10. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
11. Under section 2035, only those payments made within three years of the date
of the decedent's death could be considered. See note 4 supra. The premium-payment
test, if used in conjunction with this section, would therefore provide for the inclusion of that part of the proceeds which bears the same proportion to the premiums
paid by the decedent within three years of his death as the full amount of the pro•
ceeds bears to the total amount of premiums paid. Thus, in the example used in
note 8 supra, if A had transferred the $100,000 policy three years and one day before
he died (after paying $30,000 in premiums), had continued-in contemplation of death
-to pay the premiums, and had paid $20,000 in premiums between the time of the
transfer and his death, two-fifths of $100,000, or $40,000, would be included in his
estate since he had paid two fifths of the premiums within three years of his death.
12. See, e.g., A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 324 (3d ed. 1962); Brown &: Sherman,
Payment of Premiums as Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 101 TRUSTS &: EsTATI:S
790 (1962); MacKay, Life Insurance in the Estate Plan, 43 B.U. L. R.Ev. 270, 273-75
(1963); Mannheimer, Wheeler, &: Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured,
13 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL TAXATION 247, 260 (1955); Simmons, District Court
Invalidates IRS' Three-Year Premium Payment Rule, 29 J. TAXATION 338 (1968);
Yohlin &: Bomze, Some Unresolved Gift and Estate Tax Problems of the Unfunded
Irrevocable Insurance Trust, 41 TAXES 521, 535-37 (1963); sources cited in note 13
infra.
13. C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 287; w. WARREN &: s. SURREY, FED•
ERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 523 (1961 ed.); Goodson, Are Life Insurance Pro•
ceeds Gifts in Contemplation of Death?, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 25 (1964); Schwartz,
Life Insurance Estate Planning, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1961).
14. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 11.
15. The theory is based on the concept that the payment of the last premium was
the effective cause of the payment of the proceeds to the beneficiary. It is probably
applicable only to term policies, since it gives no effect to the payment of prior
premiums. Yohlin &: Bomze, supra note 12, at 536. This approach suggests that an
appropriate test for inclusion of proceeds should be the payment of the last premium.
However, this is not one of the tests used under section 2042 and never has been a
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theory, a revival of the premium-payment test, that part of the
proceeds which is attributable to the premiums paid by the decedent
in contemplation of death would be included in the decedent's gross
estate. Several commentators have anticipated that the Internal
Revenue Service would take this position,16 and by 1962 at least
one district director of the Internal Revenue Service had adhered to
it. 17 In 1967 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 67-463, 18 officially
adopting this position, and a recent federal district court case has
accepted that ruling. 19 However, in another recent case, Gorman v.
United States,20 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan expressly rejected the ruling and accepted the third theory: that
only the actual amount of the premiums paid in contemplation of
death should be included.
Revenue Ruling 67-463 relied primarily21 on the 1945 decision
test under previous provisions. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 271-91.
It should also be noted that this theory rests on the implicit assumption that if the
decedent had not paid the last premium no one else would have, although the policy
owner would certainly have had an interest in maintaining the vitality of the policy.
For a recent rejection of the theory, by way of dictum, see Goodnow v. United States,
302 F.2d 516, 520 (Ct. CI. 1962).
16. See authority cited note 13 supra.
17. In Los Angeles. Brown & Sherman, supra note 12, at 790. However, the practice apparently was not universal among district directors; a 1965 case in which the
theory would have been relevant did not even consider its application. LaMade v.
Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965). The decedent had paid premiums for
two of the three years preceding his death on an insurance policy which he had
long since transferred to his wife. Without discussing the payment of premiums, the
court held that none of the proceeds of the policy were includible in his estate.
18. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327.
19. First Natl. Bank v. United States, 2 CCH FED. Esr. & GIFT TAX REP. (69-1 U.S.
Tax Cas.) 11 12,574 (W.D. Te.x. Dec. 11, 1968). The position advanced by Revenue
Ruling 67-463 was accepted without discussion.
20. 2 CCH FED. Esr. & GIFT TAX REP. (68-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 11 12,553 (E.D. Mich.
July 25, 1968). The government has informally indicated its intention not to appeal
this case. FED. EsrATE & GIFT TAX REP. 142 (Feb. 11, 1969).
21. The ruling also made reference to Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940); Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.
1967), reversing 43 T.C. 920 (1965); and Chase Natl. Bank v. United States, 278 U.S.
327 (1929). However, the support which these cases provide for the ruling seems
limited.
Lehman v. Commissioner was a reciprocal trust case quoted in the ruling for the
proposition that "'[a] person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a
trust is the settler, even though in form the trust is created by another ..• .' " 109
F.2d at 100, quoting I A. Scorr, TRUSTS 785 (1939). Since the statement is quoted in
the ruling without comment, the proposition for which it is supposed to stand may be
open to question. It may be intended to indicate that if a decedent paid an insurance
company to give the proceeds to the beneficiary he should be considered as having
given those proceeds himself. This, however, is merely the basis for the use of the
premium-payment test in the first instance. Since the test has been repudiated by
Congress (see note 35 infra and accompanying te.xt), there seems to be no reason to
revive the test purely on the basis of this theory. Furthermore, the propriety of
reasoning even this far from an isolated statement concerning reciprocal trusts is
itself questionable. If the statement was intended to support the point that the
result reached by the ruling would be the same if the decedent transferred the policy
other than in contemplation of death or if the policy was originally owned by an-
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of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Liebmann v. Hassett,22 the case which has been universally recognized23 as providing
a rationale for the revival of the premium-payment test. Liebmann
involved the taxation24 of proceeds from life insurance policies
which the decedent gave to his wife in contemplation of death. The
First Circuit relied on Professor Randolph Paul's deductions from
the existence of the premium-payment test under other sections of
the applicable Code25 and held that although the proceeds (rather
than the cash value of the policies on the date of transfer) should
be included in the gross estate, that portion of the proceeds attributable to the premiums paid by the wife should be excluded.
other, its use was probably legitimate (Simmons, supra note 12, at 339), but unnecessary (see note 27 infra); and the case cannot then provide support for the basic
position taken in the ruling.
Scott v. Commissioner was a community property case. In that part of the opinion
relevant to Revenue Ruling 67-463, the Ninth Circuit used the amount of premiums
paid from the decedent's separate funds to determine the extent of his ownership
interest in the policy, the value of which was then included in his gross estate pursuant to section 2042. See Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967);
Rev. Rul. 67-228, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 331.
In Chase Natl. Bank v. United States, the Supreme Court was merely concerned
with whether payment by an insurer could be considered a transfer by the decedent
so that the tax could be considered a tax upon the transfer and, therefore, constitu•
tional. The decedent was the owner of the policy and the proceeds were included
under a provision relating to policies owned by a decedent, Revenue Act of 1921,
§ 402, 42 Stat. (pt. 1) 278 (1921). The Court did indicate that the includible amount
was the value of that which was received by the beneficiary rather than the cost to
the decedent, but it did not consider whether this would be the case if the decedent had no ownership interest in the policy.
22. 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
23. See authorities cited in notes 12 and 13 supra.
24. Under the Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 70 (1926), as amended,
Revenue Act of 1934, § 404, 48 Stat. 754 (1934).
25. Professor Paul argued that the amount included in an estate under the provision for transfers in contemplation of death should not be greater than the amount
which would be included if there had been no transfer. R. PAUL, supra note 6, at 551
n.9. If, under section 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (the statute relevant to the
Liebmann case), there had been no transfer of the policy, the gross estate would in•
clude proceeds only from policies "taken out" by the decedent. This would not include any portion of the proceeds attributable to payments made by another person,
since, under the relevant regulations at that time, the premium-payment test was in
use. See R. PAUL, supra note 6, at 512-14.
Section 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 provided for the inclusion in the gross
estate of all property "[t]o the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries
as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life." 44 Stat.
(pt. 2) 71 (1926). A 1941 amendment to the 1937 regulations had interpreted "taken
out":
Where a portion of the premiums or other consideration was actually paid by
another and the remaining portion by the decedent, either directly or indirectly,
such insurance is considered to have been taken out by the latter in the proportion that the payments therefor made by him bear to the total amount paid for
the insurance.
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25, T.D. 5032, 1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 427, 428.
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Assuming that some part of the proceeds should be included in the
gross estate, the Liebmann case supports the position taken in the
ruling; Liebmann resulted in the inclusion of the part of the insurance proceeds attributable to premiums paid by the decedentinsured. But the question is whether there is-under the Code
provisions now prevailing-a sound basis for extending the Liebmann principle to the situation presented in Gorman, as the revenue
ruling has done.
In Gorman the district court held that the Liebmann principle
should not be so extended. The decedent's wife had apparently26
taken out the policy originally; thus, no transfer of the policy itself
was involved. But, the revenue ruling explicitly states that this fact
would not affect the conclusion which it advances. 27 All of the
premiums were paid by the decedent, who died approximately one
year after the policy had been issued. The Government asserted
that since all the premium payments were made in contemplation
of death, all of the policy proceeds should be included in the gross
estate pursuant to section 2035.
The court rejected this contention, distinguishing Liebmann on
the ground that in that case there was implicit support for using a
premium-payment test, because such a test would have been used
under the then applicable Code provisions28 to determine the taxability of proceeds from policies transferred to another whether or
not the transfer was in contemplation of death.29 Since this test was
deliberately eliminated from the income tax law in 1954, when section 2042 was enacted, the court stated that the premium-payment
concept should not now be reintroduced under section 2035. Furthermore, the court suggested that if the theory relied on in Liebmann-that an amount should not be included in the gross estate
under the contemplation-of-death provision unless it would be
included if there had been no transfer30-was followed in Gorman,
only the amount of the premiums paid should be included. Thus,
26. The court did not decide whether the decedent or his wife was the original
owner of the policy. The matter is not easily determined, since the decedent made
all the arrangements for the issuance of the policy, but it was issued listing his wife
as the owner. 'Whether this constitutes a transfer by the decedent is apparently an
open question. Simmons, supra note 12, at 339-40. For purposes of discussion, it is
assumed that the wife was the original owner of the policy and that the Gorman
case is in direct conflict with Revenue Ruling 67-463.
27. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327, 328. Although it might be thought
that Gorman could be distinguished from the ruling on this basis, the IRS position
on this issue appears sound. If a policy has been transferred other than in contemplation of death it must, for estate tax purposes, be treated as though the decedent
never owned it. Therefore, the same result must follow in the situation in which
another person originally owned the policy.
28. See note 25 supra.
29. See C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 274-75.
30. See note 25 supra.
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dismissing the other cases relied on by the ruling more or less summarily, 31 the court concluded that the decedent's transfer in contemplation of death consisted only of the amount of the premiums
which he had paid.32
It is submitted that the Gorman court's rejection of revenue
ruling 67-463 was appropriate. In the first place, it is essential to
realize that Congress did repudiate the premium-payment test as
applied in the section specifically concerning inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the gross estate.33 When this matter was under
consideration prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, a minority
of the House Ways and Means Committee vigorously opposed the
removal of the test. 34 Both the Senate and the House Reports discussed the question, 35 but when enacted, the Code did not provide
for the use of the premium-payment test. 36 In 1957 an attempt was
made to re-establish the test, 37 but it was defeated. This legislative
history strongly suggests that the premium-payment test should not
be applied under section 2035 to accomplish the result which Congress sought to avoid by eliminating that test from section 2042. As
suggested above, congressional rejection of the premium-payment
test indicates that the Liebmann case, which relied on the existence
of the test38 under the Revenue Act of 1926, should be disregarded
under the present Code. Other differences between the present Code
provisions and those relevant to Liebmann also lead to this conclusion; Liebmann would be decided differently under the present
law. When the Revenue Act of 1942 was passed, the test applied in
Liebmann was replaced by a provision calling for inclusion of proceeds if the decedent had paid premiums39 or possessed any incidents
31. Largely for the reasons indicated in note 21 supra.
32. Having distinguished Liebmann, the court based its decision on four major
considerations. First, the right to pay premiums belongs to the owner of the policy,
and since the decedent's wife was the owner, the disposition of the premium amounts
was under her control. The policy proceeds could not, therefore, be properly identified with decedent's premium payments. See MacKay, supra note 12, at 275; cf. Walker
v. United Order of The Golden Star, Inc., 212 Mass. 289, 98 N.E. 1039 (1912). Second,
Congress has clearly indicated that the premium-payment test is not generally appropriate. See note 33 infra and accompanying text. Third, the donee benefited only
by the amount of the premium paid. Of course, this conclusion depends completely
on the assumption that if the decedent had not paid the premiums his wife would
have. Finally, the court reasoned that it is the nature of the insurance contract itself
which enhances the value of the premiums rather than any process analogous to the
growth in value of a trust res. See also Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516, 51920 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
33. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 276.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Bl4-15 (1954).
35. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A316-17 (1954).
36. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
37. H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 56 (1957).
38. See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
39. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944 (1942), which became INT. REv.
CODE OF 1939, § 8ll(g)(2)(A).
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of ownership.40 Under this section it was consistently held that payment of premiums by another person was irrelevant-if the decedent
had possessed any incidents of mvnership of a policy or if he had
transferred them to another person in contemplation of death (as in
Liebmann), the full amount of the policy proceeds would be included in the gross estate.41 Under the 1954 Code, the courts have
continued to hold that if the decedent retained any incidents of
mvnership, no part of the policy proceeds may be excluded merely
because some of the premiums were paid by another.42 Since exclusion of part of the proceeds-permitted in Liebmann-can no
longer be obtained, that case does not, under the present Code,
provide logical support for the position taken in the revenue
ruling. 43
Since the Liebmann case fails to support the Government's position,44 it is important to examine analogous cases in the area of
transfers in contemplation of death. Specifically, it is submitted that
among the various analogies which might be drmvn, the payment of
premiums by a decedent is most similar to a gift of cash from a
decedent invested by his donee upon receipt-a case in which only
the cash amount would be included in the estate.45
Although there are few cases concerning the valuation of gifts
made in contemplation of death when one donee did not retain the
original property,4° some generalizations can be made. If a gift is
40. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944 (1942), which became INT. REv.
CODE OF 1939, § 81l(g)(2)(B).
41. See, e.g., Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959); Fried v. Granger,
105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), afj'd, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); Estate of Collino
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956); Estate of Goldblatt v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
204 (1951).
42. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965); Estate of Piggott
v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965).
43. It has also been suggested that even if the Liebmann result were possible
under the present Code, application of the Liebmann principle to the Gorman facts
is inappropriate since there is an essential difference between the payment of a
premium by a donee (as in Liebmann) and the payment by a donor (as in Gorman).
Yohlin &: Ilomze, supra note 12, at 535-36. While this may be true, it is difficult to
determine why this difference should, of itself, lead to a different tax result.
44. Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code there was explicit provision for the
use of the premium-payment test in the section concerning life insurance (see notes 6
and 7 supra), so litigation over the use of the test did not often arise. Under the
1954 Code, Gorman and First Natl. Dank v. United States, 2 CCH FED. EsT. &: GIFI'
TAX REP. (69-1 U.S. Ta.x Cas.) ,I 12,574 (W.D. Tex. Dec. II, 1968) are the only relevant
cases, and both were decided after the issuance of the Ruling.
45. In Gorman, the Government was willing to concede that an outright gift in
the amount of the premium would be includible only at the cash· value. Simmons,
supra note 12, at 339.
46. C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 435. It should be noted that the
Code provides for the inclusion of "all property •.. of which the decedent has made
a transfer in contemplation of death" at "the value at the time of his death." INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. This seems to imply that the sale and reinvestment by
the donee of property transferred to him in contemplation of death are irrelevant,
and tl1at the value of the property, whoever owns it, should be the includible amount.
If a transfer is revocable, this result does not follow, since the transfer in such a case
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irrevocable and consists of a specific asset, the value of that asset on
the date of the decedent's death47 should be included in his gross
estate, even if the donee no longer owns the asset. 48 When the gift
is of cash, the cash amount will be included in the estate without
regard to any reinvestment by the donee. 49 If a gift is in trust, the
amount included in the estate will be the value of the trust res60 on
the date of the decedent's death, whether or not the assets in the
trust are identical to those which were originally transferred to it.lit
The characterization of a life insurance premium payment within
this context is difficult. It is similar to a gift of a specific asset in
that the value of the gift to the donee is an increase in the value of
the life insurance policy. It can also be viewed as similar to a gift of
cash in that the donor parts with money and has no ultimate control
over the eventual disposition of the transfer. 02 Finally, such payment may be likened to a gift in trust since the value of the gift is
enhanced without action by the donor or the donee and the amount
is held by a third party for eventual distribution to the beneficiary. li3
The purpose of section 2035 suggests that the analogy to a gift
of cash is the most appropriate. 54 That section is intended to preis not complete until the decedent's death. See Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986,
989-90 (5th Cir. 1942). Apart from the logic of this conclusion, a revocable transfer
will be included pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038. See also INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 2036(a)(2).
47. The Code also provides for an alternative valuation date, generally one year
after the decedent's death. In this Note, as in the Code, "date of death" should be
read to mean date of death or alternative valuation date. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2032(b).
48. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 817 (1947); Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-l(e) (1958); Lowndes &: Stephens, Identification
of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 l\I1cH. L. REv. 105, 140 (1966). There
is, however, dictum in Estate of Kroger, 12 P-H TAX CT. Mat. ,r 43,392 (1943),
affd, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866 (1945), indicating
that the includible amount is the value of the assets actually held by the donee at
the date of the decedent's death. If the gift is revocable, this will certainly be the
value included in the decedent's estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038; Howard v.
United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942); Whited v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 947
(W.D. La. 1963); C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 437.
49. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 817 (1947). See note 45 supra.
50. Income accumulated by the trust will not usually be considered a part of the
res. See note 54 infra.
51. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935); Estate of Kroger, 12
P-H TAX CT. MEM. ,f 43,392 (1943), afj'd, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 866 (1945); C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 435.
52. Both because the insured can pay the premiums only with the owner's consent,
MacKay, supra note 12, at 275; cf. Walker v. United Order of The Golden Star, Inc.,
212 Mass. 289, 98 N.E. 1039 (1912); and because the owner may at any time terminate
the insurance policy and obtain the cash surrender value.
53. The analogy to a trust is the most unsatisfactory. See note 54 infra. Since the
owner of an insurance policy may surrender it and obtain the cash surrender value,
the analogous trust would be one that is terminable at will by the beneficiary.
54. The Government apparently disagrees: "A premium payment ..• is analogous
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vent avoidance of the estate tax by returning to the estate that which
would have been in it absent transfers in contemplation of death. 55
Thus, the characteristics of premium payments which should be
relevant are those which relate to the transferor and the effect of
the transfer on his estate. The value of the gift to the donee should
be irrelevant, as should any external similarities to a trust. The
central consideration should be that if the insured had not paid
the premiums his estate would have been larger by only the
premium amount. More important, if he had not paid the premiums,
no part of the policy proceeds would have been in his estate. Returning his estate to what it would have been without the transfer
simply requires treating the premium payments as gifts of cash and
including only the premium amount in the estate. On the specific
facts of Gorman, this conclusion is even more compelling. '\1/here
the policy owner has been someone other than the decedent from
the beginning and the insured's only active connection with the
policy has been the payment of premiums, the argument that he
to a gift of specific property•••. Unlike the unrestricted gift of money, a premium
payment is a gift of insurance protection, a transfer of an interest in the policy which
is transmuted at death into the proceeds of the policy." Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cul\f.
BULL. 327, 328. However, it may be questioned whether a premium payment can
legitimately be called a transfer of an interest in the policy. The decedent could have
transferred an interest in the policy only if he had such an interest to transfer. Estate
of Karagheusian, 23 T.C. 806, 814 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1956) (acq. as to another issue, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 7). If, however, the decedent
did have such an interest, section 2042(b) would apply to make the proceeds includiblc, and the Government's reliance on section 2035 would be unnecessary. Indeed, this reliance on section 2035 may be taken as an admission that the decedent
had no interest in the policy; thus, the Government's argument is self-defeating.
See Brown &: Sherman, supra note 12, at 790.
It is also important to note that income from a trust is not included in the estate
[INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035, Treas. Reg. 20.2035-l(e) (1958); McGehee v. Commis~ioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813
(7th Cir. 1952) (acq. 1966-1 Cm,r. BULL. 2); Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th
Cir. 1949) (acq. 1966-1 Cu~r. BULL. 2)], although accumulated income may be included
if the decedent has retained the power to determine the distribution of income [INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038; United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966);
Commissioner v. Hager's Estate, 173 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1949)]. This fact provides
additional support for including only the cash value of the premium payments in the
c:statc, for it indicates that an increase in the value of the transfer not attributable
to an increase in the market value of the u·ansferred asset itself should not be included. The maturation of a life insurance contract is certainly not attributable to
an increase in the value of the money given by the donor; therefore, the proceeds
should not be included.
55. Igkheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 709 (5th Cir. 1935); C. LOWNDES & R.
supra note 1, at 60. With this in mind, it may be questioned whether the
disparate treatment of gifts in trust and outright gifts is proper, for the effect on the
donor's estate is identical in both cases. See Pavenstedt, Taxation of Transfers in
Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition, 54 YALE L.J. 70, 88-90 (1944). The
special treatment of trusts has, however, been characterized as "sensible.'' C. LOWNDES
& R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 435. See also Lowndes & Stephens, supra note 48, at
139.
KRAMER,
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paid the premiums in order to avoid having the policy proceeds in
his estate is not persuasive.
The result reached in Gorman is also desirable because it is consistent with other tax provisions. Under section 2036, which deals
with transfers with a retained life estate, it has been held that
premiums cannot be identified with policy proceeds for the purpose
of equating the payment of premiums with a transfer of the policy
and, hence, of the proceeds. 56 Indeed, it has even been held that the
payment of premiums coupled with a failure to alter a provision
that income from proceeds of a policy on the life of decedent's
husband would go to the decedent for life and then to others did not
constitute a transfer of those proceeds by the decedent. 57 Certainly
these cases tend to refute the argument that a decedent, by paying
premiums, transfers an interest in the policy. Similarly, the gift tax
regulations 58 indicate that the payment of a premium is a gift in the
amount of the premium rather than a gift of any interest in the
policy itself. 59 Finally, in Hyde v. Commissioner, 60 a 1962 income
tax case, the Second Circuit held that payment of premiums by
someone other than the tax.payer must be reported as income and
that the appropriate amount to report is the premium amount rather
than the increase in the cash value of the policy. The fact that the
Gorman approach is consistent with other tax provisions is an important consideration in assessing the validity of Revenue Ruling
67-463.
Thus, the better-reasoned view appears to be that when a decedent has transferred a life insurance policy to another person, 61
other than in contemplation of death, but has continued to pay the
premiums, only the actual amount of the premiums paid should be
included in his gross estate. This is also the preferable result in the
somewhat different factual context assumed to exist in Gorman, 62
where the policy was never transferred but was owned originally
by the decedent's wife.
However, it is not entirely clear that this was the actual situation
in Gorman. The court stated that it made no difference whether
the wife owned the policy originally or the decedent took it out and
56. Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
57. National City Bank v. United States, 371 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1966).
58. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-l(h)(S) (1958).
59. The Government itself contends that the federal estate ta.x and the federal
gift tax are to be construed in pari materia. Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516,
520 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
60. 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962). This case is another indication that the payment
of premiums should not be identified with the increased value of the policy.
61. Provided, of course, that the proceeds are not payable to the estate and that
the decedent had not retained any of the incidents of ownership, since either of these
factors would trigger the operation of section 2042.
62. See note 26 supra.
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transferred it to her later. 63 That statement is clearly wrong, for
two reasons. First, if the decedent did transfer the policy to his wife,
that transfer was probably in contemplation of death since he died
within one year of the alleged transfer and the court did determine
that he had paid the premiums in contemplation of death. Such a
transfer would have been covered by section 2035, and the entire
amount of the proceeds would have been includible in the gross
estate. Second, even if the policy was not actually transferred in
contemplation of death, 64 that very question would certainly require
the court's consideration if a transfer of the policy was involved in
the case. Whether the decedent or his wife was the original owner of
the policy would therefore make some difference, at least in terms
of the analysis of the case.
Because of this factual uncertainty, it is impossible to draw final
conclusions about the propriety of the Gorman decision. It is necessary to know whether the decedent transferred the policy to his wife
or whether she owned it from the outset; if there was a transfer, we
should also determine whether or not it was accomplished in contemplation of death. If the wife was the original owner of the policy,
or if the transfer to her was not in contemplation of death, it is submitted that Gorman was correct in rejecting Revenue Ruling 67-463
and including only the amount of the premiums paid in the decedent's gross estate.
63. "[U]nder either the plaintiff's theory that decedent had no interest in the policy
other than payment of the premium, or under the government's theory that the plaintiff (sic] had interest [sic] in the policy and did transfer the policy, we are still limited
to an amount equal to the premium." 2 CCH FED. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. (68-2 U.S.
Tax Cas.) ,r 12,553, at 8799 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 1968). It appears that the question
of whether a policy has been transferred when one individual makes all the arrangements for issuance of the policy but it is issued with another person named as the
owner is still open. Simmons, supra note 12, at 339-40.
64. While the transfer of a life insurance policy might seem to be naturally associated with contemplation of death [Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955,
956-57 (2d Cir. 1950); cf. Diamond's Estate v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 672 (7th Cir.
1947); Davidson's Estate v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1946)], such is not
necessarily the case. Various other motives for such a transfer have been recognized;
see, e.g., Estate of Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963) (acq. 1964-2 Cu11r.
BULL. 6); Flick's Estate v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948); Cronin's Estate
v. Comi~sioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947); Bruns v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. ,r 12,112 (N.D. Cal. 1962); Estate of Hunt v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1182 (1950).
The payment of premiums would seem even less necessarily associated with contemplation of death than the transfer of a policy. See Brown & Sherman, supra note
12, at 791; cf. Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946); Estate of Hull v. Commissioner,
325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963) (acq. 1964-2 Cu11r. BULL. 6). Where there is no transfer of
the policy involved, the question of includibility of proceeds does not even arise unless
it is first determined that the premiums were paid in contemplation of death.

